Since then the protected asset has fallen. At the 17 November close CVR Energy was $38.01, 25.5% below its 30 September price, so IEP's 71.2m CVR shares were worth about $0.92bn less than the $3.63bn in its September table. IEP's units closed at $3.19 and returned -23.4% from 13 November, including the $0.50 distribution that went ex on 16 November, while MSCI World net fell 2.8%. IEP has published no net asset value or hedge result for these weeks (closes from Nasdaq for CVR Energy and IEP).
The longer record is the main finding. From 2005 to 2025, $100 compounded at the funds' reported annual returns became $128.14, against $561.22 in MSCI World and $143.17 in Treasury bills, by our calculation. Between 2014 and 2025 the funds' short positions subtracted 217.9 percentage points of return, summed across years, while the long positions added 120.2.
Copio's assessment: the funds compounded weakly, the short book repeatedly subtracted return, and debt adds liquidity risk. The record does not demonstrate protection that improved whole-portfolio growth after costs. It also does not isolate what smaller hedges or less debt would have achieved: the refining hedges partly protect CVR held outside the funds, whose rise to 30 September outweighed their losses.
What is in the fund?
Icahn Enterprises (Nasdaq: IEP) is a listed holding partnership, so "Icahn's portfolio" has two layers: IEP's controlled companies and the private Investment Funds through which it invests in listed securities. Mr. Icahn owns 100% of the general partner and about 87% of the depositary units (10-Q for 30 September 2026, Risk Factors, p. 64). IEP, Mr. Icahn and certain family members and affiliates are the only investors in the funds.
| 30 Sep 2026 | $m | Share |
|---|
| CVR Energy (71%) | 3,631 | 52.2% |
| Investment Funds | 1,370 | 19.7% |
| Real Estate | 1,309 | 18.8% |
| Other businesses | 651 | 9.4% |
| Gross asset value | 6,961 | 100% |
| Holding cash | 921 | |
| Holding debt | -4,415 | |
| Net asset value | 3,467 | |
Source: IEP earnings release, 3 November 2026, indicative net asset value table; CVR Energy at market price; other businesses are automotive, Vivus, WestPoint Home, Viskase, CVR Partners and other net assets; shares are our calculation; composition (CSV). Management values most private businesses with consultants' discounted cash-flow and comparison models, and some at book equity; it notes that the units are not redeemable at this value.
At 30 September one listed refiner was more than half of IEP's gross asset value. CVR Energy's stake was worth $1,961m at 30 June and $3,631m at 30 September, at market prices, and about $2,706m at the 17 November close of $38.01, by our calculation. On 2 November CVR agreed to buy two refineries from Marathon Petroleum for about $4.2bn, with IEP committing up to $500m of equity backing, expected to fall away once CVR completes a $500m share offering (investor presentation, 5 November 2026, p. 11).
That offering of 10,515,248 shares at $47.55 closed on 5 November, according to Mr. Icahn's Schedule 13D/A of 6 November. Under the subscription agreement, public-offering proceeds reduce IEP's commitment dollar for dollar (13D/A of 3 November). IEP sold no shares in the offering, and its unchanged 71,201,875 CVR shares fell from 70.8% to 64.1% of the company.
The Investment Funds
At 30 September the funds held long positions equal to 101% of their net asset value and short positions equal to 108%, a net short exposure of 7% (10-Q, Investment Segment Liquidity, p. 55). The shorts split into 91% equities and 17% commodities, mostly index swaps and commodity contracts. Excluding refining hedges, the funds were net long 57%, against 23% three months earlier.
Gross exposure of 209% of capital, in swaps, forwards and short sales, is the funds' leverage. IEP's interest of about $1.4bn was 89% of the funds' assets; the interest of Mr. Icahn and his affiliates fell from $908m at the end of 2025 to $161m, after they redeemed $450m during 2026. IEP itself redeemed $240m (10-Q, pp. 43 and 56).
The largest disclosed holdings were Caesars Entertainment ($313m, 5% ownership), Centuri ($287m, 14%), International Flavors & Fragrances ($250m, 1%), Monro ($71m, 16%) and SandRidge Energy ($69m, 14%), counting forward contracts but excluding cash-settled swaps (presentation, p. 10). Carl Icahn's 13F for 30 September 2026, filed on 13 November, puts 47.2% of its $9.43bn of reported US shares in IEP units and 38.5% in CVR Energy, by our calculation.
Debt, pledges and distributions
The Holding Company owed $4,415m in senior notes with coupons from 4.375% to 10%, against $921m of cash. About $1.4bn of 5.25% notes held by outside investors fall due in May 2027, more than the cash on hand; IEP expects to refinance, use cash or redeem fund interests (10-Q, pp. 53-54). At 30 September the indentures did not permit new net borrowing beyond refinancing.
Gross assets plus cash were 2.27 times indicative net asset value, by our calculation. Mr. Icahn and his affiliates had pledged 658,924,537 units, the same number his 13F reports, plus about $33m of fund interests, for personal loans maturing in July 2028. The loan's value test uses IEP's indicative net asset value, so "a continued decline" in it "could result in margin calls" (10-Q, pp. 64-65).
IEP pays $0.50 a unit each quarter, in cash or new units at the holder's choice, with units as the default. In the first nine months of 2026 it issued 116.5m new units and paid $159m in cash, $75m of it to Mr. Icahn and his affiliates (10-Q, p. 54). Units outstanding rose 18.8% to 756,961,276, by our calculation, so holders taking cash own a shrinking share.
November's filings show the funds trimming a top holding. Carl Icahn's Form 4 of 12 November, its amendment correcting the prices, a Form 4 of 17 November and a Schedule 13D/A of 13 November report Icahn Partners selling 1,663,694 Centuri shares from 9 to 13 November at $21.84 to $22.82. The funds kept 12,672,350 shares, 12.55% of Centuri.
None of the November filings reports a purchase or sale of IEP units by Mr. Icahn. The Form 144 of 10 November, filed under IEP's file number, names Cadence Design Systems as issuer and a Cadence director selling 750 Cadence shares. IEP's two Form 4s of 13 November report cash-settled deferred unit awards to the CEO and CFO, vesting on 31 October 2028 (CEO, CFO).
Why does Icahn use this structure?
The case IEP makes is activism with protection. Its 10-K for 2025 says the funds "seek to acquire securities in companies that trade at a discount to inherent value", using tender offers, proxy contests and "demands for management accountability" to unlock it. Mr. Icahn sets and leads the strategy.
In February 2024 Mr. Icahn wrote: "I have come to believe that activism, on a risk reward basis, is the best investment paradigm that exists. While this method of investing certainly is somewhat volatile, over the long term the returns cannot be matched" (release, 21 February 2024). He cited a 1,066% rise in the units, distributions reinvested, from 1 January 2000 to 16 February 2024, against 436% for the S&P 500.
The same release explained the hedges: "There are also times when our hedge book can go against us and overwhelm the performance of our long positions. This underperformance has occurred several times in IEP's history." He added that he expected returns "to improve back to historical levels where our long positions far outperform our hedges."
On the refining hedges, Mr. Icahn wrote in August 2026: "Over the years, we have maintained a significant hedge position against our refining investments. While I believe this strategy has generally served well in mitigating risk, our results this quarter were impacted by exceptional geopolitical events" (second-quarter release, 5 August 2026). He said IEP was "continuing to right-size our hedge portfolio to better align with our underlying exposures."
Two further claims support the structure. Liquidity: in November 2024 Mr. Icahn wrote that "we have always maintained a war chest of liquidity" when he halved the distribution to $0.50 (release, 8 November 2024). Diversification: the November 2026 presentation says IEP's spread "across multiple industries and geographies provides a natural hedge against cyclical and general economic swings" (p. 6).
The filings also state the limits. The 10-Q says the refining hedges "may not correlate with changes in the value of CVR Energy and therefore may not produce the intended offset", and may "increase collateral and other liquidity requirements" (p. 44). The 10-K says the funds may leave a risk unhedged when they "do not regard the probability of the risk occurring to be sufficiently high as to justify the cost of the hedge".
IEP reports one return a year for the Investment Funds, so we compare matched calendar years with MSCI World net total return in US dollars, using Treasury bills as the cash benchmark and downside target. From 2005 to 2025 the funds compounded at 1.19% a year, MSCI World at 8.56% and bills at 1.72%. The ratios below are annual-observation ratios.
2004 to September 2026: $100 becomes $72.02 at the funds' reported returns and $627.18 in MSCI World; the funds peaked in 2013 at $338.38. Sources: IEP 10-K returns tables for 2005-2007, 2008-2010, 2011-2013, 2014-2016, 2017-2019, 2020-2022, 2023-2025 and the Q3 2026 10-Q; MSCI World NETR USD; annual returns and wealth (CSV).
| 2005-2025 | Funds | MSCI World |
|---|
| CAGR | 1.19% | 8.56% |
| Ending value of $100 | $128.14 | $561.22 |
| Sharpe (annual) | 0.07 | 0.49 |
| Sortino (annual) | 0.11 | 0.80 |
| Worst year (2008) | -35.6% | -40.71% |
| Largest fall, year-ends | -62.3% | -40.71% |
| Losing years | 10 of 21 | 5 of 21 |
The record splits in two. From 2005 to 2013 the funds compounded at 14.50% a year against 6.15% for the index. From 2014 to 2025 they lost 7.77% a year while the index gained 10.41%. The funds' largest fall in year-end value, 62.3%, ran from the 2013 peak to 2024. Returns to 2011 are gross of the fees and incentive allocations that applied while outside investors were in the funds, so they flatter the early years.
The funds took more measured risk than MSCI World, 20.19% against 17.10%, for a mean annual return of 3.08% against 10.13%; a mix of 16% MSCI World and 84% bills matched that mean with 2.74% risk. Sources: as above, plus FRED TB3MS; frontier data (CSV). The curve is a restricted listed benchmark, not the funds' own opportunity set.
Treasury bills alone compounded faster than the funds over the 21 years. Including January to September 2026, the funds' annual rate over 21.75 years turns negative, at -1.50%, against 8.81% for MSCI World. Their higher measured volatility than MSCI World does not tell us how volatile the same underlying holdings would have been without hedges.
The listed units
An outside investor could only own IEP units. With distributions reinvested, monthly from January 2006 to October 2026, the units compounded at 0.22% a year against 8.70% for MSCI World, with annualised volatility of 40.8% against 15.5% (monthly inputs (CSV)).
| Jan 2006-Oct 2026 | IEP units | MSCI World |
|---|
| CAGR | 0.22% | 8.70% |
| Sharpe (monthly) | 0.18 | 0.51 |
| Sortino (monthly) | 0.26 | 0.74 |
| Largest fall, month-ends | -79.5% | -54.0% |
| CAGR, 10 years | -5.64% | 12.95% |
From their month-end peak in February 2023 to October 2026 the units lost 77.8%, distributions included. In May 2023 alone they fell 52.8%; Mr. Icahn later attributed second-quarter 2023 losses partly to short-selling, which he blamed on "the misleading and self-serving Hindenburg report" (August 2023 release). From his February 2024 statement to 13 November 2026 the units returned -57.9%, and to 17 November -67.8%, by our calculation.
Copio's reading
Is it optimal for geometric growth?
The historical record is poor; it does not establish a portfolio that maximises geometric growth. The analytical objective is expected log wealth over decades after costs, subject to distributions, collateral needs and refinancing $1.4bn in May 2027. Testing alternatives would require the same underlying holdings, including CVR outside the funds, with different hedge and financing arrangements. The published returns do not supply that comparison, but they support three specific concerns.
First, weak compounding accompanied concentrated exposure. CVR Energy was 52.2% of gross asset value at 30 September and the funds hold large stakes in a few companies. The funds lost 7.77% a year over 2014-2025 while MSCI World gained 10.41%. CVR's rise to October and its 35% fall from the 30 October close to 17 November show both sides of concentration: the big position moves the whole of IEP.
Second, repeated short-book losses demand a whole-portfolio explanation. The short book subtracted return in 9 of the 12 years from 2014 to 2025. Its −0.93 correlation with long-book annual contributions is consistent with offsetting risk, but does not establish better compounded growth. In 2026 the refining hedges cost $917m attributable to IEP over nine months, against a CVR gain of about $1.8bn outside the funds.
Short positions subtracted 217.9 percentage points from 2014 to 2025, summed across years, while long positions added 120.2; in January to September 2026 the shorts subtracted 47.1 points and the longs added 0.8. Sources: performance attribution tables in the 10-Ks for 2016, 2019, 2022 and 2025 and the Q3 2026 10-Q; returns and attribution (CSV).
Third, current financing creates a material cash commitment. The Holding Company's notes carry a face-weighted coupon of 7.41% at 30 September 2026, by our calculation. That rate describes today's debt, not the financing cost throughout the return history. The practical concern is whether cash generation and unpledged assets can meet interest, maturities and collateral demands during losses.
The decisive missing comparison is IEP's underlying assets, including CVR, with and without the hedges over their full life, after financing and liquidity costs. The filings we read separate refining-hedge losses only in 2026. Copio's verdict: weak compounded results and repeated hedge drag are established; a growth-maximising alternative is not.
Is it crash aware and protected?
Crash aware in intent, unreliable in protection, and exposed to forced selling through debt and pledges. In MSCI World's five losing years since 2005, the funds did better than the index four times: 2008 (-35.6% against -40.71%), 2011 (+34.5% against -5.54%), 2018 (+7.9% against -8.71%) and 2022 (-2.4% against -18.14%). In 2015 they lost 18.0% while the index fell 0.87%.
The 2026 quarters show what the refining hedge did when tested. In the first quarter, CVR's stake rose $605m and the hedges lost $320m (May 2026 release). In the second, CVR's stake fell $435m and the refining hedges also lost, $99m inside the funds, alongside $332m on broad market hedges (10-Q for 30 June 2026).
The one quarter in which the protected asset fell, the protection lost money too. Mr. Icahn's own explanation, "exceptional geopolitical events", describes a hedge that depends on refining margins and oil prices moving with CVR's share price. That link can break, as the 10-Q warns.
Leverage turns losses into liquidity demands. Added short positions at counterparties that take cash collateral require further collateral equal to "100% of the mark to market on adverse changes in fair value" (10-Q, p. 56); the 2027 notes exceed Holding Company cash; and Mr. Icahn's loans can trigger margin calls if indicative net asset value falls. The 10-Q also notes that his fund withdrawals can be met by "proceeds from sales of assets held by the Investment Funds".
The units add a further layer. At 30 September they traded at $6.75, about 1.5 times indicative net asset value of roughly $4.49 a unit, by our calculation from 772.3m unit equivalents. In October they fell 23.1% while MSCI World fell 0.77%, even though management said on the call that net asset value rose in October.
By 17 November they closed at $3.19, below September's indicative net asset value of $4.49 a unit, though that value has since moved with CVR's price and the distribution. On 19 November the units closed at $3.01 and CVR Energy at $33.90, 33.5% below its 30 September price (Nasdaq). A buyer of the units carries the risk of the premium disappearing as well as the assets falling.
Is it diversified without sacrificing growth?
Low correlation accompanied weak growth; it does not by itself establish useful diversification. Over 2014-2025 the funds' annual returns correlated -0.18 with MSCI World and the short book -0.48. The long and short books correlated -0.93: in most years the shorts offset the longs, including in the years the longs did well.
Observed correlation of calendar-year returns, 2014-2025: funds with MSCI World -0.18; short book with MSCI World -0.48; long with short book -0.93; IEP units with MSCI World -0.25. Source: IEP 10-K attribution tables, MSCI World NETR USD, IEP unit prices and distributions; correlation matrix (CSV). Twelve annual observations are too few for firm conclusions, and annual data hide how the books moved within each year.
Over the full 2005-2025 sample the funds correlated 0.36 with the index, and monthly IEP unit returns 0.38 from 2006 to 2026. A negatively correlated hedge can lose money on its own and still help a portfolio. Here, repeated short-book drag and weak fund growth make the whole-portfolio cost-benefit test essential; these correlations cannot settle it. At 30 September IEP's "natural hedge" across industries rested on one refiner for over half its gross assets.
Copio does not grade IEP in its portfolio checker, because a book of concentrated single stocks, swaps, short sales and holding-company debt cannot be reproduced faithfully with UCITS ETFs.
What you can do now
IEP's record shows that a hedge is judged on the whole portfolio's compounded result, and that concentration and borrowing decide whether losses force sales. These checks apply that test to your own holdings, without copying IEP's positions:
- Find your CVR. List any holding above a fifth of your investments and what happens to your plans if it falls 35% in under three weeks, as CVR did from 30 October to 17 November 2026.
- Price each hedge. Record the exposure it protects, its premiums or financing costs and its payoff on the same stress dates as that exposure.
- Compare compounded results. Measure the whole portfolio over identical dates, including costs, contributions and withdrawals; a sum of annual attribution points is not that result.
- Check your liquidity. Set accessible cash and unpledged assets against spending, loan maturities and possible collateral demands, because a margin call can force sales during losses.
- Use copio. Measure concentration in your largest holdings, replay past crashes on your holdings and see which holdings are real diversifiers and which fall together.
Our study of Bill Ackman's Pershing Square looks at another concentrated activist book held through a listed vehicle, and Mark Spitznagel's tail hedging examines protection designed so that its cost is limited to an option premium. Leopold Aschenbrenner's fund is a younger example of concentration with hedges, and Sharpe ratio versus CAGR explains why compounded growth is the measure that counts.
Our review of Dan Loeb's Third Point finds a similar split: a London-listed feeder that beat MSCI World from 2008 to 2014 and trailed it from 2015 to 2024.